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Implementing and Applying Strategies to Combat Illicit Trafficking in the Caribbean (Part Two): A Regional Approach

By November 19, 2025No Comments

By Jean-Marc Behar January 16, 2018

I previously wrote an article entitled Implementing and Applying Strategies to Combat Illicit Trafficking in the Caribbean (Part One), A National Approach[1] in which I advocated and recommended that Caribbean countries develop and adopt a National Strategy in an attempt to address illicit trafficking in Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW). The intended goal behind a national strategy is to thoroughly investigate and pursue all leads surrounding the seizure of one or more firearms above & beyond the information that gave rise to the seizure itself. The intent is to begin uncovering the identities of traffickers and identifying the networks associated with this activity.

The purpose of this follow-up article is to show how the development & implementation of a regional strategy can enhance and complement a national strategy in order to make it that much more efficient and successful.

Caribbean nations have historically relied on maritime trade to acquire, sell, and barter goods across the region. Not all goods were legal depending on local laws, and yet contraband continued to move about despite border control attempts. The barter system in the Caribbean is still alive and well, and contraband continues to move throughout. Commodities & drugs are routinely utilized as currency to finance the purchase of firearms and ammunition. For this paper, when I speak of firearms, I am talking about illegal firearms that are being imported into any given country outside the legal retail channels that are sanctioned by the various governing bodies through their licensing authorities and duties. It is not uncommon for firearms to hopscotch one or more times from one island to another prior to arriving at their end destination. Anecdotal and trace data reveal that firearms in the Caribbean do not always travel from Point A (the source country) to Point B (the end user or consumer). Some examples of such activity can be found in Jamaica, a country that does not have much money but produces an agricultural product that is sought after in many countries, that is, marijuana. Enterprising Jamaicans and Haitians use go-fasts or skiffs outfitted with outboard motor(s) and laden with drums containing extra fuel to ferry hundreds, if not thousands of pounds of compressed marijuana to Haiti[2]as well as to Central America[3]. Once there, they usually trade the marijuana for a number of guns, hard drugs (cocaine from Colombia), depending on the geographical location and money that they in turn, bring back to Jamaica. Since Haiti does not manufacture firearms, the assumption is that such items were illegally introduced into the country at some point from another part of the world, usually the United States. Such an activity is commonly referred to as the “Guns for Ganja” trade. The firearms and ammunition

usually stay in Jamaica while the cocaine continues northward towards the United States, Canada, or Europe.

This trafficking activity is not undertaken by a lone actor and usually requires the coordinated efforts of many people acting in concert across bodies of water customarily associated with Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that have far-reaching tentacles throughout the Caribbean and the Americas. These TCOs may be under the command of a centralized body or may be independent criminal enterprises loosely affiliated with one another for the sole purpose of moving contraband and, in the end, profiting financially. Although their activities are illegal, they are, in essence, engaged in international trade just like other multi-national corporations engaged in lawful international commerce. The exception is that their activities carry an element of danger, are free of formal regulations and a threat to citizens & governments that at times do not seem able to curb their activities.

The danger that these TCOs pose and the fact that they utilize old-fashioned remuneration methods outside of the regulated banking systems bring to light the very reason why Caribbean nations need to come together and develop a Regional Strategy to specifically address and combat illicit trafficking in SALW, components, and ammunition, with the main goal being “Information Sharing”. There are many reasons behind the need to develop and adopt a Regional Strategy:

  1. Countries that have implemented a National Strategy will invariably produce leads or actionable intelligence with a nexus outside of their respective jurisdiction and thus have a need to share this information for follow-up or in furtherance of identifying further members of a TCO or maybe a previously unknown TCO.
  2. Many countries in the Caribbean receive international aid and cooperate to counter drug trafficking activity in an attempt to stem the flow of drugs before they reach the United States, Canada, or the European Union (EU). The same cannot be said for assistance and cooperation to stem the flow of firearms to the Caribbean. The number of people and units involved in counterdrug missions throughout the Americas and the Caribbean dwarfs the handful of people specifically assigned to combat illicit trafficking in SALW. Caribbean nations need to recognize that fact and take control of their own destiny with respect to illegal firearms, pool their resources in the most efficient manner, identify their collective needs, and map out their own counter-strategies.
  3. Firearms trace data[4] reveals that the United States is not the sole country of provenance for illegal firearms making landfall in the Central and South America do play a role in the supply chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has a small footprint in the Caribbean, but the Agents there cannot really follow the trail of firearms that do not have a U.S. Nexus. There needs to be an outlet or a central Caribbean repository for information on all actors and trafficking networks dealing in firearms, regardless of their nexus.
  4. International training in countering illicit trafficking in SALW in the Caribbean comes in all shapes and forms. One cannot blame any given country for accepting free training, and yet there is a need to ensure that all nations receive similar training and that expected outcomes are the The investigative capabilities of police forces across the Caribbean with respect to countering illicit trafficking in SALW vary across jurisdictions, and there is a strong need for standardization across the board that would dictate the reporting requirements and information sharing parameters surrounding each and every firearm(s) seizure. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and each Caribbean country is a link in the chain tasked with combating illicit trafficking in SALW.
  5. Several very competent forensic laboratories across the Caribbean examine, analyze, and catalog ballistic evidence. These labs utilize the Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS). Sadly, the hard work of the forensic examiners is not fully exploited as a crime-fighting tool, mostly because the individual jurisdictions do not necessarily understand the capabilities and benefits that the science brings to their crime-fighting efforts. IBIS can also contribute to the initial identification of a trafficking scheme, and in those cases, a need arises to have a readily available outlet for said information.
  6. Per capita murder rates in some Caribbean nations are alarmingly high[5]. The majority of these murders are committed with firearms. Anecdotal evidence points to the existence of certain actors willing to travel within the Caribbean to commit murders for a fee or Murder for Hire. There is a strong need to perform correlations of ballistic evidence across

jurisdictions. Currently, a very small number of countries are theoretically interconnected through a correlation server hosted by Interpol in Lyons, France; however, correlations and comparisons are not routinely requested or performed

  1. There are islands in the Caribbean that are a department or territory of the Customarily in those jurisdictions, trace requests are routed through Interpol in France, and ballistic evidence is sent back to their respective labs in Europe for examination and correlation. It should be noted that French Saint Martin, as well as Dutch Sint Maarten, realized very quickly that it made more sense to send trace requests through ATF directly rather than awaiting months for results on requests submitted through Interpol. To their credit, these jurisdictions understood the dynamics of illicit trafficking in SALW in the Caribbean and how it affected them as a region, and this minor tweak paid off.
  2. A mechanism or protocol must be established to automatically & routinely share and correlate results from ballistic evidence that was recovered in the Caribbean but submitted to EU Forensic Laboratories for examination and This disconnect between Caribbean labs and European labs must be remedied.
  3. Besides the local vernacular, such as Jamaican Patois or Haitian Creole, there are four languages spoken in the Caribbean: (1) English, (2) Spanish, (3) French, and (4)

Dutch. Regardless of the language, there must be a mechanism in place to overcome those differences to facilitate the flow of information in real time and without undue delays.

There are many other reasons why Caribbean nations need to develop and commit to a Regional Strategy, and the nine points mentioned above are not all-encompassing or necessarily listed in order of importance or preference. As individual countries adopt and refine their respective National Strategies, local investigations will become more sophisticated as well as productive. The resulting effect of these investigations will, at the very least, create a need to pass on useful information or intelligence to an affected jurisdiction. The better outcome will be that this information will be actionable and that both jurisdictions will benefit from a law enforcement intervention through a coordinated effort. A Regional Strategy cannot succeed until such time as member states:

  • Recognize the need for such a strategy and buy into the concept,
  • Establish and put in place mechanisms and personnel to ensure the free flow of information back and forth regardless of a language barrier.
  • Agree to a common investigative methodology and procedures,
  • Actively contribute to the regional cause by sharing information and intelligence,
  • Immediately address actionable intelligence and provide feedback,
  • Bring investigations to successful fruition that include prosecutions and convictions, and
  • Hold regular regional meetings to discuss lessons learned in order to tweak the regional strategy with an ever-constant eye on improvement in order to set a new path forward for all parties.

Only then will a Regional Strategy begin to flourish into a productive and positive

concept. Occasionally, countries working cooperatively through an informal or pseudo-regional strategy have a measure of success, and those cases are but a minor example of the potential of a formal, fully formed regional relationship. Examples of such can be found in the news, such as a case between Jamaica and Haiti[6] that led to the seizure of 13 firearms in 2015. Or between the Dominican Republic (DR) and ATF[7] that led to the arrest of an active duty army sergeant involved in the trafficking of firearms to the DR. At times, a Regional Strategy will also point to the possibility of public corruption such as a 2016 case between the DR and ATF that led to the arrest of high ranking members of the Dominican military and police officials involved in the trafficking of firearms to their country[8]. These examples are but a fraction of what can truly be achieved through a cooperative international working relationship for the common good of the region as a whole.

Investing in a Regional Strategy to combat illicit trafficking in SALW will, in time, bear fruit towards dismantling TCOs involved in this illegal activity. Besides the obvious reduction in the flow to the Caribbean, member states will also put a dent in criminal gang activity, enhance the successes of drug trafficking investigations as well as possibly help reduce the overall homicide rate afflicting the region by identifying the most active firearms and aiding police forces to zero in on the people responsible for pulling the trigger. Firearms flowing to the Caribbean come from not only the United States but also from other countries bordering the basin. Caribbean nations need to come together and take control of their own future individually as well as collectively. A proven National Strategy can only serve to bolster a Regional Strategy, and

conversely, a committed Regional Strategy can only serve to improve and strengthen a National Strategy.

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