By ATF SSA Jean-Marc Behar 3 November 2017
Travelling throughout the Caribbean addressing the illicit trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons affecting the region, there is a common refrain that I hear when meeting with high-ranking government officials attached to the various ministries, police institutions and Directorates of Public Prosecution or equivalents. No matter the language of the country, the statements are very similar in nature: “We do not manufacture firearms here in (insert name of Caribbean Country or island of choice), so the firearms have got to be coming from somewhere”.
One of the tenets of the United States Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) is to encourage Caribbean nations to utilize the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) eTrace program in order to ascertain the provenance of each and every firearm or “Crime Gun” seized in any law enforcement activity or from an intercepted package/shipment at a port of entry in their respective jurisdictions.1 If a firearm has been manufactured or lawfully imported into the United States in the past, then theoretically ATF will be able to derive how and where the firearm was manufactured/imported and track its history in the United States all the way up to the retailer who sold it as well as the first purchaser of record.2
Assuming the information provided about the firearm is complete and accurate, trace results are returned to the requestor with one of two outcomes: (1) a successful trace showing the history of the firearm from manufacture/importation to the point of sale, or (2) an unsuccessful trace with an annotation stating that the Firearm queried has “No U.S. Nexus” meaning that it was neither manufactured in nor imported into the United states throughout its lifetime. The “No U.S. Nexus” label is also assigned to firearms that were lawfully sold from the U.S. to a foreign purchaser in international trade and sanctioned by the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce. The reason behind labeling those firearms as such is that ATF can no longer track their movements to a purchaser once they have left the United States.
A “No U.S. Nexus” result is pretty much a dead end with respect to any follow up investigation for U.S. Law Enforcement unless the firearm(s) was/were seized from a shipment that had originated from the United States. If however there is no nexus to the United States because of the shipping point, then Interpol’s Illicit Arms & Tracing Records Management System IARMS3 could potentially be of assistance.
1 https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/data-statistics
2 https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/guide/atf-firearms-tracing-guide-atf-p-331213
3 https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms-trafficking/INTERPOL-Illicit-Arms-Records-and- tracing-Management-System-iARMS
Conversely, a successful trace can yield a treasure trove of information that can be extremely beneficial in investigations and that can point investigators, who understand how firearms are trafficked, in the right direction.
There are a number of key pieces of information that can be derived from a successful trace but I will only mention one for the purpose of this article, that being the Time To Crime (TTC). The TTC is the difference in days between the day the firearm was lawfully purchased from a retailer also known as a Federal Firearms Licensee in the United States and the day the firearm was recovered by Law Enforcement or customs official anywhere in the world. Investigators throughout the world who have had the benefit of working alongside ATF Agents or have been the beneficiaries of ATF’s training in Small Arms Trafficking Techniques understand how crucial the TTC is and how beneficial it can be in uncovering and identifying the people behind a suspected trafficking scheme. A good understanding of how firearms are bought and sold every day in the United States helps investigators set the direction of an investigation and establish as well as prioritize a list of tasks.
A very short TTC for a firearm would result in greater emphasis placed on the original purchaser as a potential suspect or co-conspirator in a trafficking scheme. The level of scrutiny and suspicion would be even greater if more than one firearm was seized, all with short TTC’s from the same or related purchaser(s). Conversely, if the TTC is lengthy, then the chances of identifying worthwhile targets become dimmer due to the nature of the firearms market in the United States. Private sales between two parties not licensed by the government as Federal Firearms Licensees, are not governed by any federal regulations or record-keeping mandates. Every day, an undetermined number of firearms are bought and sold in hand-to-hand transactions throughout the United States at a variety of pseudo commercial venues (gun shows) and non-commercial venues (private residence, parking lot, street, etc.). The more times a firearm changes hands in private sales, the lesser the chances of uncovering the last owner before it was trafficked or diverted to the criminal elements. If I were to illustrate the potential success of an average trafficking investigation solely based on an interview of the original purchaser of the firearm(s) and absent of any other corroborating evidence aside from trace information, it would resemble a sloped curve graph.
[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”646″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]There are no steadfast rules or quantifiable factors to gauging the success rate of a trafficking investigation based on a short TTC because a number of variables (very few of them regulatory in nature) influence the purchase and sale of firearms. The norm is that the greater the TTC, the lower the chances of finding the true culprit behind the trafficking scheme through an interview of the original purchaser.The positive outcome of working in the Caribbean is that most nations in the Basin heavily regulate their firearms markets and ownership with near 100% gun registration through a specialized unit or bureau tasked with the registration and issuance of firearm licenses. The resulting effect is that a firearm seized by the police (excluding at a port of entry) that does not figure in the firearms registry of the host nation, is suspected of having been illegally trafficked or introduced into the country. These are the crime guns that need to be closely scrutinized in order to ascertain their origins and the process begins with ATF’s eTrace notwithstanding the customary Law Enforcement interview of the possessor at the time of his/her arrest.
Investigators must remember though that eTrace is not the end all be all solution to the firearms trafficking problem affecting the Caribbean or any other geographical location, but it is an important tool in the proverbial toolbox.
Another tool that can be extremely helpful in firearms trafficking investigations is the Integrated Ballistic Identification Systems (IBIS). A nation experiencing firearms related violence must make it a priority to test-fire ALL seized firearms as well as collect ALL firearms related evidence found at a crime scene independent of whether or not a gun was recovered. Spent casings and projectiles must be collected and entered into the nation’s IBIS database for cataloging, correlation and for reference later when trying to tie incidents together in criminal street gang investigations, in
attempting to identify a suspect responsible for a number of unsolved shootings or following the recovery of one or more crime guns.
At this juncture you might be asking how can IBIS be useful in a firearms trafficking investigation?
Remember that firearms in the Caribbean are heavily regulated through a rigorous registration process. An unregistered crime gun seized in a law enforcement intervention immediately becomes suspect of having been trafficked at some point. Upon the seizure of a crime, a seasoned investigator must immediately consider that the firearm(s) in question may have two different TTC’s:
- A Time To Crime based on the recovery of the crime gun or TTC(r), that being the difference in days between the date of purchase of the firearm versus the date of its seizure by Law Enforcement, and
- A Time To Crime based on the discharge of the crime gun or TTC(d) that being the difference in days between the dates of purchase of the firearm versus the first time it was used in a crime as per IBIS records.
In instances where the ballistic information does not reside in IBIS by virtue of a prior test fire of a firearm routinely performed as part of a gun registration process, TTC(d) cannot be determined. TTC(d) will be derived once Law Enforcement recovers the crime gun and the following steps are undertaken:
- It is successfully traced to a purchaser with a corresponding sale date, and
- It is test fired; the evidence derived from such test fire is properly catalogued and correlated through IBIS with the potential hits ultimately confirmed by an expert through microscopic examination & comparison.
Jamaica is a very good example of a Caribbean country that very religiously and conscientiously utilizes IBIS through its Ministry of National Security’s Institute of Forensic Science and Legal Medicine. In the last couple of years, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) seized a number of firearms subsequent to a search warrant at a residence. These crime guns were immediately submitted for tracing through ATF’s eTrace program. Two subjects stateside were identified as original purchasers: Subject A was responsible for one firearm purchased over eight years ago and Subject B was responsible for the rest of the firearms all purchased within a year of the date of seizure. One of those firearms from Subject B had a TTC(r) in excess of eight months, a period that falls in that grey area of uncertainty as to the possibility that the firearm had changed hands in the United States prior to it finding its way to Jamaica. The rest of the TTC(r)’s for Subject B were within the one-year mark and that definitely made him a person of interest stateside. The key piece of evidence that cast a greater shadow of suspicion on Subject B was the fact that after the test firing of the firearm (TTC(r) >8 months) a TTC(d) was derived. IBIS information revealed that the crime gun in question was linked to two separate homicides that had taken place less than two and six months after its purchase in the United States.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”647″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]ATF Agents stateside could then derive a strategy and a line of questioning for the original purchaser centered on this TTC(d). Depending on the information gleaned from the interview, the Agents could then ascertain if the interviewee was truthful or deceitful in his/her answers.
This TTC(r) versus TTC(d) model applies to both Domestic as well as International investigations.
- In the United States, ATF Agents working alongside other Federal, State and local law enforcement can uncover the discrepancies through the National Integrated Ballistic Identification Network (NIBIN) and ascertain if the crime gun was used in other jurisdictions.
- On the international scene, effective communication must be present between ATF and their foreign counterparts so that the information can be shared if a difference exists between TTC(r) and TTC(d)
As investigators trying to solve gun crimes, we must adjust our vocabulary, terminology and critical thinking in order to incorporate and highlight the nuance between TTC(r) and TTC(d). Furthermore it is incumbent upon us to educate not only our peers in law enforcement but also prosecutors about the importance of this variance. Adopting such terminology and approach to investigating gun crimes will enable us to develop better leads that will result in greater professional successes.
We must always remember to explore every possible lead surrounding the recovery of a weapon. It is a common thought that the investigative process surrounding seized firearms should mirror that of a homicide investigation. Neither the homicide victim nor the firearm can recount the events that preceded their discovery but there are many clues left behind on both scenes, clues that an experienced investigator can exploit to his/her advantage.
A great illustration that can really encapsulate the totality of the information that can be derived from a crime gun, is one that I obtained from a friend, a mentor4 and author of a book5, The 13 Critical Tasks: An Inside-Out Approach to Solving More Gun Crime.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”648″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]A good investigator will always trace a crime gun whereas a great investigator will always exploit all of the information that comes from the inside and outside of a crime gun.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”649″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]4 Triple Barrel Strategies, LLC, registered in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Peter Gagliardi, Principal Officer.
5 Gagliardi, Peter L. 2014. The 13 Critical Tasks: An Inside-Out Approach to Solving More Gun Crime. Second edition. Cote St-Luc, Quebec: Forensic Technology Inc.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]
