Executive Summary
Firearms trafficking poses a severe threat to public safety and governance across the Caribbean. Based on data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the United States is the overwhelming source of crime guns recovered in five key Caribbean nations: The Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago. While trace submission rates vary by country, the percentage of firearms traced back to the U.S. consistently remains high, often exceeding 80% and sometimes over 95%.
Despite the scope of the problem, regional trace efforts remain uneven and in some cases underutilized. Improving trace submissions, strengthening cooperation with U.S. federal law enforcement, and leveraging modern crime gun intelligence tools such as eTrace and IBIN, or newer, nimbler & more user-friendly systems are essential steps toward meaningful reform. This white paper provides a summary of recent trace data and outlines a strategy for regional and international cooperation to disrupt the flow of illicit firearms.
I. Understanding the Data
The table below presents the most recent trace data from 2020 to 2024 for five Caribbean nations, showing the total number of trace requests and percentages of those crime guns having originated from the U.S. The percentage of firearms sourced from the U.S. is consistently high, with the Bahamas frequently exceeding 98% and Jamaica often reporting over 70%.
| Year | The Bahamas | Dominican Republic | Haiti | Jamaica | Trinidad & Tobago |
| 2024 | 240 (98.8%) | 50 (92.0%) | 46 (87.0%) | 606 (84.0%) | 207 (74.9%) |
| 2023 | 271 (98.2%) | 170 (95.3%) | NA | 276 (84.8%) | 213 (67.1%) |
| 2022 | 331 (98.2%) | 134 (97.0%) | NA | 473 (77.0%) | 389 (66.1%) |
| 2021 | 238 (99.2%) | 109 (86.2%) | 125 (84.8%) | 576 (69.4%) | 391 (51.7%) |
| 2020 | 209 (98.6%) | 76 (73.7%) | 81 (87.7%) | 472 (66.9%) | 298 (52.0%) |
Key Takeaways:
- The S. is the primary source of illicit firearms in the Caribbean.
- Some countries, like The Bahamas, submit consistent trace requests year after
- Others, particularly the Dominican Republic and Haiti, lack comprehensive tracing efforts due to limited institutional awareness, political instability (Haiti), or weak infrastructure (Haiti).
- Discrepancies in the total number of traces from year to year suggest procedural gaps in some jurisdictions, notably Trinidad & Tobago.
II. Gaps in Tracing and Enforcement
- Dominican Republic: The low number of trace submissions (e.g., only 50 in 2024) highlights a critical lack of tracing The DR should be submitting over 2,000 traces annually based on its seizure rates and on the expert opinion of this author.
- Haiti: In addition to being a recipient or end-user, Haiti is also a major transshipment point, particularly through the illicit “Guns for Ganja” trade with Jamaica. The current political instability and ineffective law enforcement in that country hamper systematic tracing or interdiction efforts.
- Trinidad & Tobago: The discrepancies in trace submissions from year to year point to potential systemic gaps between seizures and forensic follow-through or
III. Strengthening the Regional Response
To address the high volume of U.S.-sourced firearms in the region, a multifaceted strategy is required:
- Prioritize Comprehensive Tracing: Every seized crime gun, regardless of quantity or origin, should be traced through ATF’s eTrace system.
- Leverage Partnerships with S. Federal Law Enforcement Agencies: Given the origin of most crime guns, closer cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement agencies is paramount.
- Enhanced ATF Presence in the Region: Additional special agents and investigative analysts should be deployed to the region, or a specialized group created at the headquarters level or in Miami.
- Refine Metrics concerning Time-To-Crime (TTC): Caribbean Security Sector Forces, in conjunction with U.S. Law Enforcement, should use forensic outcomes to distinguish between Time to Crime (discharge) and Time to Crime (recovery) that might in turn generate new leads.
IV. A Strategic Framework for Gun Crime Investigation
The work of Pete Gagliardi, particularly his book “The 13 Critical Tasks”, could serve as a cost-effective roadmap for Caribbean LE to follow, as it offers a very useful and easy-to- follow framework:
- Adopt a systems-based approach to tracing and solving gun crimes
- Promote inter-agency and cross-border information sharing
- Fully utilize eTrace and IBIN or like system that can offer immediate
- Shift from reactive to proactive enforcement
- Ensure consistency and long-term data collection
Conclusion
Firearms trafficking in the Caribbean is a transnational issue with domestic implications. The data clearly show that most illicit guns originate from the U.S., but the Caribbean’s ability to respond varies greatly. Without comprehensive tracing, deep partnerships, and strategic intelligence practices supplemented with 21st-century technology, the region will continue to struggle against firearm-related crime.
This white paper recommends that all Caribbean governments:
- Mandate firearm tracing as standard practice
- Strengthen S. partnerships through joint investigative efforts
- Invest in forensic capacity and technology of the 21st century
- Advocate for stronger ATF support and an increase in its footprint in the region
The fight against gun crime begins with knowing where the firearms are coming from—and committing the necessary resources to stop them.
]]>Free Trade Zones (FTZs) were designed to be engines of economic development—strategically placed enclaves that facilitate international commerce by reducing trade barriers, expediting customs procedures, and incentivizing foreign investment. Today, there are more than 5,000 FTZs operating in over 140 countries, offering logistical and tax advantages to businesses operating globally. While these zones support legitimate trade and industrial activity, their operational structure also presents inherent vulnerabilities. With limited oversight, fragmented regulatory frameworks, and reduced customs scrutiny, FTZs have quietly evolved into conduits for illicit trade. This essay explores the darker underbelly of FTZs, examining how their relaxed oversight enables smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade-based money laundering. It also outlines the global implications of these activities and the urgent need for comprehensive reform.
Understanding Free Trade Zones: Intent Versus Reality
FTZs function as legally designated areas within a country where goods can be imported, stored, assembled, or re-exported with minimal interference from customs authorities. By deferring or eliminating import duties, reducing red tape, and streamlining logistics, FTZs create an attractive environment for global trade and manufacturing. However, these same features—particularly customs leniency and administrative independence—also create systemic blind spots that are routinely exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).
In many jurisdictions, FTZs operate under parallel regulatory frameworks, where national customs authorities have limited jurisdiction or are physically absent. This structural loophole makes it difficult to monitor cargo movements, verify the origin and end-use of goods, and detect fraudulent transactions in real time. Criminals, adept at manipulating complex supply chains, exploit these gaps to disguise illicit activities under the cover of legitimate trade.
Smuggling: Leveraging Weak Access Controls
Smuggling remains one of the most prevalent illicit trade practices enabled by FTZs. Goods that are prohibited, restricted, or heavily taxed—such as narcotics, arms, and tobacco—are funneled through FTZs where inspection protocols are often inconsistent or under-resourced. Once inside the zone, these goods can be repackaged, relabeled, or mixed with legitimate cargo to evade detection upon re-export.
For example, in several high-profile seizures, authorities discovered that containers declared as machinery parts or clothing in FTZs were in fact carrying illicit arms or unreported luxury goods. Because many FTZs allow for the manipulation of goods without customs intervention, criminals use these zones as staging grounds—altering paperwork, removing tracking labels, or concealing contraband within legitimate shipments.
What makes smuggling via FTZs particularly insidious is the illusion of legitimacy. When goods leave an FTZ en route to another country, they are often accompanied by documentation generated within the zone—documentation that may be fabricated or inaccurate. Destination countries, trusting the documentation from recognized FTZs, may not conduct secondary inspections, allowing illicit products to move freely across borders.
Counterfeiting: Manufacturing Legitimacy
FTZs have also become breeding grounds for counterfeit goods. From fake pharmaceuticals to knockoff electronics and branded apparel, counterfeit products are routinely produced, assembled, or transshipped within FTZs. The lack of intellectual property enforcement and limited visibility into supply chain activities allows counterfeiters to operate with minimal risk.
In some cases, FTZs serve as midpoints in complex transnational routes: raw materials or unfinished goods are shipped to the zone, where labor is cheap and oversight is minimal. There, counterfeiters apply fake branding, assemble final products, and export them under the guise of legitimate origin. Because goods are often exempt from detailed customs declarations within FTZs, authorities have little opportunity to verify authenticity.
Beyond the economic harm inflicted on brands and the legal trade system, counterfeit goods can endanger public health and safety. Counterfeit medicines may contain incorrect or harmful ingredients, while substandard electronics can pose fire and electrical hazards. When FTZs are used as the manufacturing or transit point, tracing the origin of counterfeit products becomes nearly impossible—undermining consumer protection and intellectual property laws across the globe.
Trade-Based Money Laundering: Exploiting Complexity
Perhaps the most complex and least understood form of illicit trade in FTZs is trade-based money laundering (TBML). TBML occurs when trade transactions are manipulated to disguise the origins of illicit funds. This may involve over-invoicing, under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, or falsely describing goods and services. The goal is to legitimize the movement of money across borders under the cover of trade.
FTZs are ideal environments for TBML for several reasons: the sheer volume of trade, limited customs presence, and the absence of standardized financial reporting requirements. Criminal
organizations often use shell companies to conduct trade transactions within FTZs, invoicing goods that are either non-existent or mispriced. Once the money is moved across borders, it is integrated into the financial system as if it were proceeds from legitimate trade.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has repeatedly flagged TBML as a critical threat to global financial integrity. Yet, because trade documentation is rarely verified against physical goods within FTZs, these schemes often go undetected. Financial institutions and regulators— already removed from the physical movement of goods—struggle to detect anomalies in complex, multi-jurisdictional supply chains that involve FTZs.
Systemic Challenges and Regulatory Gaps
Despite mounting evidence of illicit activity within FTZs, regulatory oversight remains inconsistent and often inadequate. Many countries do not require real-time customs reporting for FTZ transactions, and some zones are administered by private operators with little transparency. There is also a lack of international consensus on baseline standards for FTZ governance.
The World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have issued guidance urging greater scrutiny of FTZs, including recommendations for better record- keeping, stricter access controls, and increased inspections. However, adoption has been uneven. Political and economic interests often deter governments from imposing regulations that might discourage foreign investment or slow trade.
The challenge, therefore, lies in striking a balance between maintaining the commercial benefits of FTZs and securing them against criminal exploitation. Governments must adopt risk-based approaches, investing in technology that enables data-driven inspections, strengthening information-sharing between customs and law enforcement, and harmonizing regulations with international partners.
Conclusion: The Need for Reform and Vigilance
Free Trade Zones were never meant to become sanctuaries for illicit trade. Yet, without sufficient oversight, transparency, and enforcement, that is precisely what many have become. As global trade grows in volume and complexity, so too do the opportunities for exploitation by transnational criminal actors. Smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade-based money laundering are no longer fringe concerns—they are central threats that undermine economies, endanger public safety, and erode trust in international commerce.
To preserve the intended benefits of FTZs while mitigating their risks, a new era of regulatory reform is needed. This includes enhanced customs integration, mandatory data transparency, stronger public-private cooperation, and global regulatory alignment. Multinational corporations
must also conduct more rigorous due diligence in their supply chains, particularly when operating in or near FTZs.
Ultimately, the solution lies not in dismantling FTZs, but in transforming them—shining a light into the shadows, and ensuring these zones serve trade, not crime. As the global economy becomes more interconnected, securing FTZs is not just a matter of policy—it is a matter of global security.
References
World Free Zones Organization. https://www.worldfzo.org/ World Customs Organization. Illicit Trade Report (2022).
https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and- programmes/illicit-trade-report.aspx
OECD C EUIPO. Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Free Trade Zones (2021). https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/trade-in-counterfeit-goods-and-free-trade-zones- 9789264289550-en.htm
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Trade-Based Money Laundering. https://www.fatf- gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/trade-based-money-laundering.html
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2021.html
OECD Recommendation on Countering Illicit Trade (2021). https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/recommendation-on-countering-illicit-trade-2021.htm
]]>Free Trade Zones (FTZs) were designed to be engines of economic development—strategically placed enclaves that facilitate international commerce by reducing trade barriers, expediting customs procedures, and incentivizing foreign investment. Today, there are more than 5,000 FTZs operating in over 140 countries, offering logistical and tax advantages to businesses operating globally. While these zones support legitimate trade and industrial activity, their operational structure also presents inherent vulnerabilities. With limited oversight, fragmented regulatory frameworks, and reduced customs scrutiny, FTZs have quietly evolved into conduits for illicit trade. This essay explores the darker underbelly of FTZs, examining how their relaxed oversight enables smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade-based money laundering. It also outlines the global implications of these activities and the urgent need for comprehensive reform.
Understanding Free Trade Zones: Intent Versus Reality
FTZs function as legally designated areas within a country where goods can be imported, stored, assembled, or re-exported with minimal interference from customs authorities. By deferring or eliminating import duties, reducing red tape, and streamlining logistics, FTZs create an attractive environment for global trade and manufacturing. However, these same features—particularly customs leniency and administrative independence—also create systemic blind spots that are routinely exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).
In many jurisdictions, FTZs operate under parallel regulatory frameworks, where national customs authorities have limited jurisdiction or are physically absent. This structural loophole makes it difficult to monitor cargo movements, verify the origin and end-use of goods, and detect fraudulent transactions in real time. Criminals, adept at manipulating complex supply chains, exploit these gaps to disguise illicit activities under the cover of legitimate trade.
Smuggling: Leveraging Weak Access Controls
Smuggling remains one of the most prevalent illicit trade practices enabled by FTZs. Goods that are prohibited, restricted, or heavily taxed—such as narcotics, arms, and tobacco—are funneled through FTZs where inspection protocols are often inconsistent or under-resourced. Once inside the zone, these goods can be repackaged, relabeled, or mixed with legitimate cargo to evade detection upon re-export.
For example, in several high-profile seizures, authorities discovered that containers declared as machinery parts or clothing in FTZs were in fact carrying illicit arms or unreported luxury goods. Because many FTZs allow for the manipulation of goods without customs intervention, criminals use these zones as staging grounds—altering paperwork, removing tracking labels, or concealing contraband within legitimate shipments.
What makes smuggling via FTZs particularly insidious is the illusion of legitimacy. When goods leave an FTZ en route to another country, they are often accompanied by documentation generated within the zone—documentation that may be fabricated or inaccurate. Destination countries, trusting the documentation from recognized FTZs, may not conduct secondary inspections, allowing illicit products to move freely across borders.
Counterfeiting: Manufacturing Legitimacy
FTZs have also become breeding grounds for counterfeit goods. From fake pharmaceuticals to knockoff electronics and branded apparel, counterfeit products are routinely produced, assembled, or transshipped within FTZs. The lack of intellectual property enforcement and limited visibility into supply chain activities allows counterfeiters to operate with minimal risk.
In some cases, FTZs serve as midpoints in complex transnational routes: raw materials or unfinished goods are shipped to the zone, where labor is cheap and oversight is minimal. There, counterfeiters apply fake branding, assemble final products, and export them under the guise of legitimate origin. Because goods are often exempt from detailed customs declarations within FTZs, authorities have little opportunity to verify authenticity.
Beyond the economic harm inflicted on brands and the legal trade system, counterfeit goods can endanger public health and safety. Counterfeit medicines may contain incorrect or harmful ingredients, while substandard electronics can pose fire and electrical hazards. When FTZs are used as the manufacturing or transit point, tracing the origin of counterfeit products becomes nearly impossible—undermining consumer protection and intellectual property laws across the globe.
Trade-Based Money Laundering: Exploiting Complexity
Perhaps the most complex and least understood form of illicit trade in FTZs is trade-based money laundering (TBML). TBML occurs when trade transactions are manipulated to disguise the origins of illicit funds. This may involve over-invoicing, under-invoicing, multiple invoicing, or falsely describing goods and services. The goal is to legitimize the movement of money across borders under the cover of trade.
FTZs are ideal environments for TBML for several reasons: the sheer volume of trade, limited customs presence, and the absence of standardized financial reporting requirements. Criminal
organizations often use shell companies to conduct trade transactions within FTZs, invoicing goods that are either non-existent or mispriced. Once the money is moved across borders, it is integrated into the financial system as if it were proceeds from legitimate trade.
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has repeatedly flagged TBML as a critical threat to global financial integrity. Yet, because trade documentation is rarely verified against physical goods within FTZs, these schemes often go undetected. Financial institutions and regulators— already removed from the physical movement of goods—struggle to detect anomalies in complex, multi-jurisdictional supply chains that involve FTZs.
Systemic Challenges and Regulatory Gaps
Despite mounting evidence of illicit activity within FTZs, regulatory oversight remains inconsistent and often inadequate. Many countries do not require real-time customs reporting for FTZ transactions, and some zones are administered by private operators with little transparency. There is also a lack of international consensus on baseline standards for FTZ governance.
The World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) have issued guidance urging greater scrutiny of FTZs, including recommendations for better record- keeping, stricter access controls, and increased inspections. However, adoption has been uneven. Political and economic interests often deter governments from imposing regulations that might discourage foreign investment or slow trade.
The challenge, therefore, lies in striking a balance between maintaining the commercial benefits of FTZs and securing them against criminal exploitation. Governments must adopt risk-based approaches, investing in technology that enables data-driven inspections, strengthening information-sharing between customs and law enforcement, and harmonizing regulations with international partners.
Conclusion: The Need for Reform and Vigilance
Free Trade Zones were never meant to become sanctuaries for illicit trade. Yet, without sufficient oversight, transparency, and enforcement, that is precisely what many have become. As global trade grows in volume and complexity, so too do the opportunities for exploitation by transnational criminal actors. Smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade-based money laundering are no longer fringe concerns—they are central threats that undermine economies, endanger public safety, and erode trust in international commerce.
To preserve the intended benefits of FTZs while mitigating their risks, a new era of regulatory reform is needed. This includes enhanced customs integration, mandatory data transparency, stronger public-private cooperation, and global regulatory alignment. Multinational corporations
must also conduct more rigorous due diligence in their supply chains, particularly when operating in or near FTZs.
Ultimately, the solution lies not in dismantling FTZs, but in transforming them—shining a light into the shadows, and ensuring these zones serve trade, not crime. As the global economy becomes more interconnected, securing FTZs is not just a matter of policy—it is a matter of global security.
References
World Free Zones Organization. https://www.worldfzo.org/ World Customs Organization. Illicit Trade Report (2022).
https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/activities-and- programmes/illicit-trade-report.aspx
OECD C EUIPO. Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Free Trade Zones (2021). https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/trade-in-counterfeit-goods-and-free-trade-zones- 9789264289550-en.htm
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Trade-Based Money Laundering. https://www.fatf- gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/trade-based-money-laundering.html
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2021.html
OECD Recommendation on Countering Illicit Trade (2021). https://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/recommendation-on-countering-illicit-trade-2021.htm
]]>Criminal Organizations Profit and Their
Impact on Law-Abiding Companies
Examining the Challenges and Charting a Path Toward Solutions by
Jean-Marc Behar.
Introduction
Tariffs, intended as tools for economic regulation, can inadvertently create opportunities for exploitation by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). These groups, adept at navigating global trade complexities, manipulate tariff systems to maximize profits, expand their influence, and undermine legitimate economic activities. Their illegal schemes often leave law-abiding companies struggling to compete in distorted markets while governments grapple with lost revenues and enforcement challenges. Addressing this multifaceted issue requires a comprehensive understanding of TCO tactics, their broader economic and social impacts, and coordinated strategies to mitigate the problem. How Transnational Criminal Organizations Exploit Tariffs Smuggling and False Declarations TCOs frequently engage in smuggling to circumvent tariffs entirely. By transporting goods across borders covertly, they evade customs duties and other fees, selling these products at lower prices than legitimate businesses. Alternatively, false declarations—a tactic where goods are misclassified to attract lower tariff rates—allow these organizations to reduce their costs fraudulently. For example, luxury goods may be mislabeled as low-value items, or restricted goods may be rebranded as permissible products. Exploiting Free Trade Zones Free trade zones (FTZs), established to promote economic growth by reducing trade barriers, have become hotbeds for illicit activities. Criminal organizations exploit the lack of stringent oversight in many FTZs to mislabel products, alter documentation, or reroute shipments to disguise their origin. By doing so, they take advantage of preferential tariff rates or avoid tariffs altogether. 5 May, 2025
HEMISPHERICA VIGILANCE GROUP
Trade-Based Money Laundering
Tariffs provide a convenient framework for TCOs to engage in trade-based money laundering (TBML). This sophisticated tactic involves the manipulation of trade invoices to move illicit funds across borders. Over-invoicing, under-invoicing, or multiple invoicing for the same shipment are common methods used to launder money while simultaneously avoiding or minimizing tariff payments.
Exploiting Tariff Differentials
TCOs also capitalize on tariff differentials between countries. By routing goods through nations with lower tariffs or preferential trade agreements, they reduce costs and increase their profit margins. This practice not only undermines the intended economic impact of tariffs but also creates unfair competition for legitimate businesses adhering to the rules. The Impact on Law-Abiding Companies
Market Distortion
The activities of TCOs create significant market distortions, as law-abiding companies are forced to compete with entities that operate outside the bounds of legality. These criminal networks undercut prices by evading tariffs, making it difficult for legitimate businesses to remain competitive. Over time, this can erode entire industries, leading to job losses and economic instability.
Reputation and Compliance Costs
Companies operating legally often face increased scrutiny and compliance costs as governments implement stricter regulations to combat illicit activities. While these measures are necessary, the added financial burden disproportionately affects smaller businesses with limited resources. Furthermore, the association of certain industries or regions with illicit trade can tarnish reputations, making it harder for legitimate companies to attract investment and customers.
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
TCO activities exacerbate vulnerabilities in global supply chains. By infiltrating legitimate trade networks, they introduce counterfeit goods, disrupt supply chain integrity, and create mistrust among stakeholders. This not only affects the bottom line of law-abiding companies but also poses risks to consumer safety and satisfaction.
HEMISPHERICA VIGILANCE GROUP
Steps Toward Addressing the Problem Strengthening International Cooperation
The transnational nature of TCOs necessitates a coordinated international response. Governments, law enforcement agencies, and private sector stakeholders must work together to share intelligence, harmonize regulations, and conduct joint operations. Organizations such as INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization can play pivotal roles in facilitating this collaboration.
Enhancing Customs and Border Controls
Investments in technology and training can significantly improve the ability of customs and border officials to detect and deter illicit activities. Advanced tools such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and blockchain technology can be used to analyze trade data, flag anomalies, and ensure the authenticity of documentation.
Promoting Transparency in Trade
Greater transparency in global trade is essential to counter TCOs. Initiatives such as the adoption of digital trade platforms, standardized documentation, and the implementation of end-to-end supply chain visibility can reduce opportunities for manipulation. Governments can also incentivize compliance by rewarding businesses that adopt best practices.
Tackling Corruption
Corruption is a major enabler of TCO activities. Efforts to combat corruption within customs and border agencies—through stricter oversight, whistleblower protections, and the prosecution of corrupt officials—are crucial. Transparency International and similar organizations can support these initiatives by providing expertise and advocacy.
Engaging the Private Sector
Law-abiding companies have a vested interest in addressing the challenges posed by TCOs. By forming public-private partnerships, businesses can contribute valuable insights, resources, and innovations to enhance enforcement efforts. Industry associations can also play a role in raising awareness and promoting collective action.
HEMISPHERICA VIGILANCE GROUP
Conclusion
The exploitation of tariffs by transnational criminal organizations represents a complex and pressing challenge with far-reaching consequences. From market distortions and economic losses to weakened supply chain integrity and reputational damage, the activities of TCOs undermine the foundations of fair trade and global economic stability. However, through strengthened international cooperation, enhanced enforcement measures, and proactive engagement with the private sector, it is possible to mitigate these threats. Addressing this issue requires a sustained and collaborative effort, but the
rewards—restored market integrity, increased revenues, and a level playing field for law- abiding businesses—are well worth the investment.
]]>by Jean-Marc Behar 01 May 2025
Introduction
Illicit trade, which encompasses the illegal exchange of goods such as counterfeit products, contraband, and smuggled items, represents a significant challenge to global economies. Tariffs, which are taxes imposed on imports and exports, play a key role in shaping international trade policies. However, while tariffs are designed to regulate trade and protect domestic industries, they can inadvertently fuel illicit trade activities. This document delves into the intersection of tariffs and illicit trade, exploring how regulatory measures often lead to unintended consequences and outlining strategies for mitigating these risks.
The Role of Tariffs in Trade Regulation
Tariffs serve as a tool for governments to control the flow of goods across borders. Their primary functions include:
- Revenue Generation: Tariffs contribute to national budgets, providing a steady stream of income for
- Protectionism: By imposing higher tariffs on foreign goods, governments can shield domestic industries from external
- Trade Policy: Tariffs can be used to incentivize or dissuade trade with specific nations, reflecting broader geopolitical
While these mechanisms are designed to promote fair trade and economic growth, they also create opportunities for illicit trade activities to thrive in regions where enforcement is weak.
How Tariffs Contribute to Illicit Trade
High Tariffs as a Catalyst for Smuggling
When tariffs are excessively high, they raise the cost of imported goods, making legal trade less attractive. This often leads businesses and individuals to seek alternative, illegal channels. Smuggling becomes a lucrative option as it bypasses the financial burdens associated with tariffs. For example, the global tobacco industry has faced significant challenges with smuggling due to high excise taxes and tariffs, resulting in billions of dollars lost in revenue annually.
Counterfeit Goods and Grey Market Activities
In markets with high tariffs, consumers may turn to counterfeit or grey market goods, which are often sold at lower prices. These products not only evade tariffs but also undermine intellectual property rights and consumer safety. The luxury goods industry, particularly fashion and electronics, is a prime example where high tariffs have led to a proliferation of counterfeit items.
Undeclared and Mis-Declared Imports
High tariffs incentivize illicit traders to underreport the value of goods or misclassify products to escape taxation. Fraudulent documentation is often used to circumvent tariff obligations, leading to significant losses for governments and legitimate businesses.
Case Studies Highlighting Tariff-Induced Illicit Trade
The Tobacco Industry
The tobacco industry provides a stark illustration of how tariffs can fuel illicit trade. Countries with stringent excise duties and import tariffs on tobacco products often experience an uptick in smuggling. Illegal tobacco not only deprives states of tax revenue but also fosters organized crime networks.
The Automotive Sector
In several developing economies, high tariffs on imported vehicles have led to a rise in smuggled or illegally assembled cars. These vehicles often fail to meet safety standards, jeopardizing consumer well-being while eroding legitimate markets.
The Pharmaceutical Industry
High tariffs on essential medicines and healthcare products in certain regions have inadvertently encouraged the sale of counterfeit drugs. These illicit products pose severe risks to public health and undermine efforts to build robust healthcare systems.
Strategies to Combat Illicit Trade
Balancing Tariff Levels
Governments must strike a balance between imposing tariffs for economic protection and ensuring they do not incentivize illegal activities. Moderate tariff rates can reduce the financial appeal of smuggling and counterfeiting.
Enhanced Customs Enforcement
Investing in advanced technology and training for customs officials can improve the detection and prevention of illicit trade. Tools such as AI-powered scanners and blockchain for tracking shipments offer promising solutions.
International Cooperation
Since illicit trade often transcends borders, international collaboration is essential. Shared intelligence, joint enforcement actions, and harmonized tariff policies can help curb cross- border illegal trade. This effort today must include an element of Public/Private cooperative partnership that includes the sharing of intelligence and information.
Consumer Awareness Campaigns
Educating consumers about the dangers of counterfeit goods and the importance of supporting legal trade is vital. Public awareness efforts can reduce demand for illicit products, thereby weakening their market viability.
Conclusion
While tariffs are a necessary component of trade regulation, their unintended consequences often manifest in the form of illicit trade. Smuggling, counterfeiting, and fraudulent practices thrive in environments where tariff enforcement is inadequate or overly burdensome. Policymakers must adopt a holistic approach that balances economic protection with proactive measures to address illicit activities. By fostering international cooperation, investing in enforcement technologies, and raising consumer awareness,
governments can mitigate the negative impacts of tariffs and promote a fair, lawful global trade environment.
]]>U.S. Market
December 14, 2023
Today, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), announced the seizure of approximately 1.4 million units of unauthorized e-cigarette products, including brands such as Elf Bar, which according to the 2023 National Youth Tobacco Survey, is the most commonly used brand among youth e-cigarette users. The estimated retail value of the seized products totals more than $18 million. The seizures were part of a three-day joint operation, which resulted in the seizure of 41 shipments containing illegal e-cigarettes.
“The FDA is committed to continuing to stem the flow of illegal e-cigarettes into the United States,” said FDA Commissioner Robert M. Califf, M.D. “Unscrupulous companies try everything they can to bring unauthorized, youth-appealing tobacco products into the country. The FDA will remain vigilant, and together with our federal partners, stop these imports before they make it into the hands of our nation’s youth.”
The FDA and CBP conducted the joint operation at a cargo examination site at Los Angeles International Airport, where the team examined incoming shipments for potentially violative items. In preparation for the three-day operation, the team worked for months to review shipping invoices, identify potentially violative incoming shipments, and complete other investigative work that led to this successful operation. Once the merchandise is forfeited to the government, it will be disposed of in accordance with the law; in the case of unauthorized new tobacco products, that generally means they will be destroyed.
“This enforcement action is a prime example of CBP’s commitment to keeping our communities safe by disrupting the importation of illegal goods into our country,” said Troy A. Miller, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner for CBP. “The rise in illicit e-commerce demands that our agencies remain vigilant in intercepting shipments that could pose serious health risks to the public, including youth, while disrupting the supply chains that bring them to our borders.”
Upon examining shipments, all of which originated in China, the team found various brands of illegal flavored disposable e-cigarette products. According to recently released 2023 National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS) data, disposable e-cigarettes are the most commonly used e-cigarette type among U.S. youth and nearly nine out of 10 current e-cigarette users (89.4%) used flavored e-cigarettes, with fruit flavors being the most popular, followed by candy, desserts, or other sweets; mint; and menthol.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”664″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]In addition to Elf Bar, among the seized e-cigarettes were EB Create products; earlier this year, the manufacturer of Elf Bar began marketing the product under the names “EB Design” and “EB Create.” Other seized brands included Lost Mary, Funky Republic, RELX Pod and IPLAY Max, among others. In an attempt to evade duties and detection, many of these unauthorized e-cigarettes were intentionally mis-declared as various items such as toys or shoes and listed with incorrect values.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”665″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]
“Those shamelessly attempting to smuggle illegal e-cigarettes, particularly those that appeal to youth, into this country should take heed of today’s announcement,” said Brian King, Ph.D., M.P.H., director of the FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products. “Federal agencies are on to their antics and will not hesitate to take action. The significant value of these seized products is also a sobering reminder to these bad actors that their time and money would be better spent complying with the law.”
The FDA uses a comprehensive approach to tobacco product compliance and enforcement, taking action against those in the supply chain that violate the law, including manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers, such as the targeted operations described in today’s announcement. The FDA also regularly addresses the importation of illegal e-cigarettes by placing certain firms on an FDA import alert red list, which allows the FDA to detain products without conducting a full inspection at the time of entry. For example, in May, the FDA placed certain firms associated with unauthorized youth-appealing e-cigarettes on a red list, including firms associated with the Elf Bar brands.
To date, the FDA has authorized 23 tobacco-flavored e-cigarette products and devices that may be lawfully sold in the United States. The distribution and/or sale of
unauthorized new tobacco products is subject to compliance and enforcement action. As of December 2023, the FDA has issued over 650 warning letters to firms for manufacturing, selling and/or distributing new tobacco products that lacked marketing authorization from the FDA, including flavored disposable e-cigarettes and brands popular among youth. The FDA has also filed civil money penalty complaints against 38 e-cigarette manufacturers and 67 retailers, and seven complaints for permanent injunctions against firms marketing illegal e-cigarettes. The FDA will continue to take appropriate action against those manufacturing, distributing, importing and/or selling unauthorized e-cigarette products, especially those most appealing to youth.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row] ]]>
Jonathan Limehouse
USA TODAY
22 October 2024
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized $76 million worth of unauthorized e-cigarettes, the federal agencies announced.
The seizure announced Tuesday involved about 3 million units of illegal e-cigarettes,
the FDA said in a news release. The seizures stemmed from a July joint operation aimed at examining incoming shipments and preventing the e-cigarettes from entering the country, according to the agency.
“The FDA is on high alert and, in coordination with our federal partners, remains committed to stopping unauthorized e-cigarettes at our nation’s borders,” FDA Commissioner Robert M. Califf said in the release. “These products too often end up in kids’ hands, and the newly formed federal task force is well positioned to collectively combat this unscrupulous activity.”
The FDA and Department of Justice announced the joint federal task force in June to “curb the distribution and sale of illegal e-cigarettes.”
In July, the FDA had threatened seizing products when it issued warning letters to online retailers selling unauthorized e-cigarette items under the brand names Geek Bar, Lost Mary and Bang.
“(U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s) trade enforcement mission places a significant emphasis on intercepting illicit products that could harm American consumers,” said Troy
- Miller, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner for CBP. “We will continue to work with our enforcement partners to identify and seize unsafe and unlawful goods.”
Months before the seizure of the e-cigarettes, the team reviewed shipping invoices, identified “potentially violative” incoming shipments and completed other investigative work, according to the FDA’s release. While examining the shipments, which all originated in China, the team found various brands of illegal e-cigarettes, the agency said.
To evade duties and detection, the unauthorized e-cigarettes were intentionally misbranded as actual vaping products, including from Geek Bar and others, the FDA said. The illegal e-cigarettes did not have any connections to the real vaping products and even contained incorrect values, according to the agency.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”661″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]All government-seized and forfeited products will be disposed of in accordance with U.S. Customs and Border Protection authorities, the FDA said.
“This isn’t the first joint seizure operation, and it won’t be the last – we will continue to relentlessly pursue those attempting to smuggle illegal e-cigarettes,” Brian King, director of the FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products, said in the release. “The $76 million these bad actors just put in the dumpster should be a sobering reminder that their time and money would be better spent complying with the law.”[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row] ]]>
Brazil’s Federal Police launched an operation Tuesday against an organized crime network involved in the trafficking and smuggling of fake Paraguayan brand cigarettes. The criminal ring, active in the center-western area of Minas Gerais state, forced Paraguayan nationals to make the cigarettes in hidden factories.
According to the police report, the criminal organization was led by a businessman from São Paulo. The group picked up workers in Paraguay, blindfolded them, and drove them east across the border into Brazil, where the clandestine factories were located in
Divinópolis, in the state of Minas Gerais. The Paraguayans were essentially enslaved, as they were held under surveillance inside the factories for several months. Their telephones were confiscated and they had no contact with the outside world.
The workers produced cigarettes packaged to look like Paraguayan brands popular in Brazil, such as the Tabesa brands “TE”, “Eight”, and “Palermo”. Once finished, the cigarettes were transported in trucks, hidden behind shoes manufactured in the municipality of Nova Serrana, also in Minas Gerais state. More than 165 Brazilian Federal Police officers served 11 preventive arrest warrants, 13 temporary arrest warrants, and 35 search and arrest warrants in Minas Gerais, Amazonas, São Paulo, and Pará. They also froze more than $4 million in assets.
The suspects face charges of smuggling, counterfeiting, human trafficking, slave labor, forgery and use of false documents, misuse of machinery used for cigarette manufacturing, crime against consumer relations, crime against trademark registrations, and money laundering.
“The prisoners will be liable for one or more of the following enumerated crimes with their respective maximum penalties: criminal organization, 8 years; cigarette smuggling, 5 years; embezzlement of machinery, 4 years; human trafficking, 8 years; slave labor, 8 years; forgery and use of false private document, 5 years; crimes against consumer relations, 5 years; and money laundering, 10 years,” said the Federal Police.
Paraguay is a major contraband hub in South America. The country plays a key role in the illicit tobacco trade, especially in the triple border region between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. Several million cigarettes are allegedly produced by companies without declaring their production. More than 97 percent of cigarettes produced in Paraguay end up in countries such as Brazil. The business is also entangled with money laundering, political corruption, and criminal gang activities.
In March of this year, the OCCRP reported on the rescue of 19 Paraguayans trapped in an illegal cigarette factory in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil rescued 918 people working as slaves in the first three months of this year. This is the highest number of people rescued in the first quarter of the year in the last 15 years.
]]>I previously wrote an article entitled Implementing and Applying Strategies to Combat Illicit Trafficking in the Caribbean (Part One), A National Approach[1] in which I advocated and recommended that Caribbean countries develop and adopt a National Strategy in an attempt to address illicit trafficking in Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW). The intended goal behind a national strategy is to thoroughly investigate and pursue all leads surrounding the seizure of one or more firearms above & beyond the information that gave rise to the seizure itself. The intent is to begin uncovering the identities of traffickers and identifying the networks associated with this activity.
The purpose of this follow-up article is to show how the development & implementation of a regional strategy can enhance and complement a national strategy in order to make it that much more efficient and successful.
Caribbean nations have historically relied on maritime trade to acquire, sell, and barter goods across the region. Not all goods were legal depending on local laws, and yet contraband continued to move about despite border control attempts. The barter system in the Caribbean is still alive and well, and contraband continues to move throughout. Commodities & drugs are routinely utilized as currency to finance the purchase of firearms and ammunition. For this paper, when I speak of firearms, I am talking about illegal firearms that are being imported into any given country outside the legal retail channels that are sanctioned by the various governing bodies through their licensing authorities and duties. It is not uncommon for firearms to hopscotch one or more times from one island to another prior to arriving at their end destination. Anecdotal and trace data reveal that firearms in the Caribbean do not always travel from Point A (the source country) to Point B (the end user or consumer). Some examples of such activity can be found in Jamaica, a country that does not have much money but produces an agricultural product that is sought after in many countries, that is, marijuana. Enterprising Jamaicans and Haitians use go-fasts or skiffs outfitted with outboard motor(s) and laden with drums containing extra fuel to ferry hundreds, if not thousands of pounds of compressed marijuana to Haiti[2]as well as to Central America[3]. Once there, they usually trade the marijuana for a number of guns, hard drugs (cocaine from Colombia), depending on the geographical location and money that they in turn, bring back to Jamaica. Since Haiti does not manufacture firearms, the assumption is that such items were illegally introduced into the country at some point from another part of the world, usually the United States. Such an activity is commonly referred to as the “Guns for Ganja” trade. The firearms and ammunition
usually stay in Jamaica while the cocaine continues northward towards the United States, Canada, or Europe.
This trafficking activity is not undertaken by a lone actor and usually requires the coordinated efforts of many people acting in concert across bodies of water customarily associated with Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that have far-reaching tentacles throughout the Caribbean and the Americas. These TCOs may be under the command of a centralized body or may be independent criminal enterprises loosely affiliated with one another for the sole purpose of moving contraband and, in the end, profiting financially. Although their activities are illegal, they are, in essence, engaged in international trade just like other multi-national corporations engaged in lawful international commerce. The exception is that their activities carry an element of danger, are free of formal regulations and a threat to citizens & governments that at times do not seem able to curb their activities.
The danger that these TCOs pose and the fact that they utilize old-fashioned remuneration methods outside of the regulated banking systems bring to light the very reason why Caribbean nations need to come together and develop a Regional Strategy to specifically address and combat illicit trafficking in SALW, components, and ammunition, with the main goal being “Information Sharing”. There are many reasons behind the need to develop and adopt a Regional Strategy:
- Countries that have implemented a National Strategy will invariably produce leads or actionable intelligence with a nexus outside of their respective jurisdiction and thus have a need to share this information for follow-up or in furtherance of identifying further members of a TCO or maybe a previously unknown TCO.
- Many countries in the Caribbean receive international aid and cooperate to counter drug trafficking activity in an attempt to stem the flow of drugs before they reach the United States, Canada, or the European Union (EU). The same cannot be said for assistance and cooperation to stem the flow of firearms to the Caribbean. The number of people and units involved in counterdrug missions throughout the Americas and the Caribbean dwarfs the handful of people specifically assigned to combat illicit trafficking in SALW. Caribbean nations need to recognize that fact and take control of their own destiny with respect to illegal firearms, pool their resources in the most efficient manner, identify their collective needs, and map out their own counter-strategies.
- Firearms trace data[4] reveals that the United States is not the sole country of provenance for illegal firearms making landfall in the Central and South America do play a role in the supply chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has a small footprint in the Caribbean, but the Agents there cannot really follow the trail of firearms that do not have a U.S. Nexus. There needs to be an outlet or a central Caribbean repository for information on all actors and trafficking networks dealing in firearms, regardless of their nexus.
- International training in countering illicit trafficking in SALW in the Caribbean comes in all shapes and forms. One cannot blame any given country for accepting free training, and yet there is a need to ensure that all nations receive similar training and that expected outcomes are the The investigative capabilities of police forces across the Caribbean with respect to countering illicit trafficking in SALW vary across jurisdictions, and there is a strong need for standardization across the board that would dictate the reporting requirements and information sharing parameters surrounding each and every firearm(s) seizure. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and each Caribbean country is a link in the chain tasked with combating illicit trafficking in SALW.
- Several very competent forensic laboratories across the Caribbean examine, analyze, and catalog ballistic evidence. These labs utilize the Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS). Sadly, the hard work of the forensic examiners is not fully exploited as a crime-fighting tool, mostly because the individual jurisdictions do not necessarily understand the capabilities and benefits that the science brings to their crime-fighting efforts. IBIS can also contribute to the initial identification of a trafficking scheme, and in those cases, a need arises to have a readily available outlet for said information.
- Per capita murder rates in some Caribbean nations are alarmingly high[5]. The majority of these murders are committed with firearms. Anecdotal evidence points to the existence of certain actors willing to travel within the Caribbean to commit murders for a fee or Murder for Hire. There is a strong need to perform correlations of ballistic evidence across
jurisdictions. Currently, a very small number of countries are theoretically interconnected through a correlation server hosted by Interpol in Lyons, France; however, correlations and comparisons are not routinely requested or performed
- There are islands in the Caribbean that are a department or territory of the Customarily in those jurisdictions, trace requests are routed through Interpol in France, and ballistic evidence is sent back to their respective labs in Europe for examination and correlation. It should be noted that French Saint Martin, as well as Dutch Sint Maarten, realized very quickly that it made more sense to send trace requests through ATF directly rather than awaiting months for results on requests submitted through Interpol. To their credit, these jurisdictions understood the dynamics of illicit trafficking in SALW in the Caribbean and how it affected them as a region, and this minor tweak paid off.
- A mechanism or protocol must be established to automatically & routinely share and correlate results from ballistic evidence that was recovered in the Caribbean but submitted to EU Forensic Laboratories for examination and This disconnect between Caribbean labs and European labs must be remedied.
- Besides the local vernacular, such as Jamaican Patois or Haitian Creole, there are four languages spoken in the Caribbean: (1) English, (2) Spanish, (3) French, and (4)
Dutch. Regardless of the language, there must be a mechanism in place to overcome those differences to facilitate the flow of information in real time and without undue delays.
There are many other reasons why Caribbean nations need to develop and commit to a Regional Strategy, and the nine points mentioned above are not all-encompassing or necessarily listed in order of importance or preference. As individual countries adopt and refine their respective National Strategies, local investigations will become more sophisticated as well as productive. The resulting effect of these investigations will, at the very least, create a need to pass on useful information or intelligence to an affected jurisdiction. The better outcome will be that this information will be actionable and that both jurisdictions will benefit from a law enforcement intervention through a coordinated effort. A Regional Strategy cannot succeed until such time as member states:
- Recognize the need for such a strategy and buy into the concept,
- Establish and put in place mechanisms and personnel to ensure the free flow of information back and forth regardless of a language barrier.
- Agree to a common investigative methodology and procedures,
- Actively contribute to the regional cause by sharing information and intelligence,
- Immediately address actionable intelligence and provide feedback,
- Bring investigations to successful fruition that include prosecutions and convictions, and
- Hold regular regional meetings to discuss lessons learned in order to tweak the regional strategy with an ever-constant eye on improvement in order to set a new path forward for all parties.
Only then will a Regional Strategy begin to flourish into a productive and positive
concept. Occasionally, countries working cooperatively through an informal or pseudo-regional strategy have a measure of success, and those cases are but a minor example of the potential of a formal, fully formed regional relationship. Examples of such can be found in the news, such as a case between Jamaica and Haiti[6] that led to the seizure of 13 firearms in 2015. Or between the Dominican Republic (DR) and ATF[7] that led to the arrest of an active duty army sergeant involved in the trafficking of firearms to the DR. At times, a Regional Strategy will also point to the possibility of public corruption such as a 2016 case between the DR and ATF that led to the arrest of high ranking members of the Dominican military and police officials involved in the trafficking of firearms to their country[8]. These examples are but a fraction of what can truly be achieved through a cooperative international working relationship for the common good of the region as a whole.
Investing in a Regional Strategy to combat illicit trafficking in SALW will, in time, bear fruit towards dismantling TCOs involved in this illegal activity. Besides the obvious reduction in the flow to the Caribbean, member states will also put a dent in criminal gang activity, enhance the successes of drug trafficking investigations as well as possibly help reduce the overall homicide rate afflicting the region by identifying the most active firearms and aiding police forces to zero in on the people responsible for pulling the trigger. Firearms flowing to the Caribbean come from not only the United States but also from other countries bordering the basin. Caribbean nations need to come together and take control of their own future individually as well as collectively. A proven National Strategy can only serve to bolster a Regional Strategy, and
conversely, a committed Regional Strategy can only serve to improve and strengthen a National Strategy.
- https://linkedin.com/pulse/implementing-applying-strategies-combat-illicit-caribbean- behar/
- http://www.loopjamaica.com/content/haitian-among-two-busted-1300-pounds-ganja-st- bess-beach
- https://caribbeannationalweekly.com/caribbean-breaking-news- featured/department-state-cites-caribbean-countries-major-drug-transit-points/
- https://atf.gov/resource-center/data-statistics
- https://data.unodc.org/#state:0
- : https://jcf.gov.jm/news-updates/news/thirteen-guns-seized-through-collaboration- haiti-and-jamaica
- http://www.7dias.com.do/portada/2015/06/11/i190359_apresa-mujer-introducia-pais- armas-que-adquiria-legalmente-eeuu.html#.VXoUBUvxj7Igo
- https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/dominican-military-accused-of-trafficking-arms- from-us-suppliers/
By ATF SSA Jean-Marc Behar 3 November 2017
Travelling throughout the Caribbean addressing the illicit trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons affecting the region, there is a common refrain that I hear when meeting with high-ranking government officials attached to the various ministries, police institutions and Directorates of Public Prosecution or equivalents. No matter the language of the country, the statements are very similar in nature: “We do not manufacture firearms here in (insert name of Caribbean Country or island of choice), so the firearms have got to be coming from somewhere”.
One of the tenets of the United States Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) is to encourage Caribbean nations to utilize the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) eTrace program in order to ascertain the provenance of each and every firearm or “Crime Gun” seized in any law enforcement activity or from an intercepted package/shipment at a port of entry in their respective jurisdictions.1 If a firearm has been manufactured or lawfully imported into the United States in the past, then theoretically ATF will be able to derive how and where the firearm was manufactured/imported and track its history in the United States all the way up to the retailer who sold it as well as the first purchaser of record.2
Assuming the information provided about the firearm is complete and accurate, trace results are returned to the requestor with one of two outcomes: (1) a successful trace showing the history of the firearm from manufacture/importation to the point of sale, or (2) an unsuccessful trace with an annotation stating that the Firearm queried has “No U.S. Nexus” meaning that it was neither manufactured in nor imported into the United states throughout its lifetime. The “No U.S. Nexus” label is also assigned to firearms that were lawfully sold from the U.S. to a foreign purchaser in international trade and sanctioned by the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce. The reason behind labeling those firearms as such is that ATF can no longer track their movements to a purchaser once they have left the United States.
A “No U.S. Nexus” result is pretty much a dead end with respect to any follow up investigation for U.S. Law Enforcement unless the firearm(s) was/were seized from a shipment that had originated from the United States. If however there is no nexus to the United States because of the shipping point, then Interpol’s Illicit Arms & Tracing Records Management System IARMS3 could potentially be of assistance.
1 https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/data-statistics
2 https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/guide/atf-firearms-tracing-guide-atf-p-331213
3 https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms-trafficking/INTERPOL-Illicit-Arms-Records-and- tracing-Management-System-iARMS
Conversely, a successful trace can yield a treasure trove of information that can be extremely beneficial in investigations and that can point investigators, who understand how firearms are trafficked, in the right direction.
There are a number of key pieces of information that can be derived from a successful trace but I will only mention one for the purpose of this article, that being the Time To Crime (TTC). The TTC is the difference in days between the day the firearm was lawfully purchased from a retailer also known as a Federal Firearms Licensee in the United States and the day the firearm was recovered by Law Enforcement or customs official anywhere in the world. Investigators throughout the world who have had the benefit of working alongside ATF Agents or have been the beneficiaries of ATF’s training in Small Arms Trafficking Techniques understand how crucial the TTC is and how beneficial it can be in uncovering and identifying the people behind a suspected trafficking scheme. A good understanding of how firearms are bought and sold every day in the United States helps investigators set the direction of an investigation and establish as well as prioritize a list of tasks.
A very short TTC for a firearm would result in greater emphasis placed on the original purchaser as a potential suspect or co-conspirator in a trafficking scheme. The level of scrutiny and suspicion would be even greater if more than one firearm was seized, all with short TTC’s from the same or related purchaser(s). Conversely, if the TTC is lengthy, then the chances of identifying worthwhile targets become dimmer due to the nature of the firearms market in the United States. Private sales between two parties not licensed by the government as Federal Firearms Licensees, are not governed by any federal regulations or record-keeping mandates. Every day, an undetermined number of firearms are bought and sold in hand-to-hand transactions throughout the United States at a variety of pseudo commercial venues (gun shows) and non-commercial venues (private residence, parking lot, street, etc.). The more times a firearm changes hands in private sales, the lesser the chances of uncovering the last owner before it was trafficked or diverted to the criminal elements. If I were to illustrate the potential success of an average trafficking investigation solely based on an interview of the original purchaser of the firearm(s) and absent of any other corroborating evidence aside from trace information, it would resemble a sloped curve graph.
[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”646″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]There are no steadfast rules or quantifiable factors to gauging the success rate of a trafficking investigation based on a short TTC because a number of variables (very few of them regulatory in nature) influence the purchase and sale of firearms. The norm is that the greater the TTC, the lower the chances of finding the true culprit behind the trafficking scheme through an interview of the original purchaser.The positive outcome of working in the Caribbean is that most nations in the Basin heavily regulate their firearms markets and ownership with near 100% gun registration through a specialized unit or bureau tasked with the registration and issuance of firearm licenses. The resulting effect is that a firearm seized by the police (excluding at a port of entry) that does not figure in the firearms registry of the host nation, is suspected of having been illegally trafficked or introduced into the country. These are the crime guns that need to be closely scrutinized in order to ascertain their origins and the process begins with ATF’s eTrace notwithstanding the customary Law Enforcement interview of the possessor at the time of his/her arrest.
Investigators must remember though that eTrace is not the end all be all solution to the firearms trafficking problem affecting the Caribbean or any other geographical location, but it is an important tool in the proverbial toolbox.
Another tool that can be extremely helpful in firearms trafficking investigations is the Integrated Ballistic Identification Systems (IBIS). A nation experiencing firearms related violence must make it a priority to test-fire ALL seized firearms as well as collect ALL firearms related evidence found at a crime scene independent of whether or not a gun was recovered. Spent casings and projectiles must be collected and entered into the nation’s IBIS database for cataloging, correlation and for reference later when trying to tie incidents together in criminal street gang investigations, in
attempting to identify a suspect responsible for a number of unsolved shootings or following the recovery of one or more crime guns.
At this juncture you might be asking how can IBIS be useful in a firearms trafficking investigation?
Remember that firearms in the Caribbean are heavily regulated through a rigorous registration process. An unregistered crime gun seized in a law enforcement intervention immediately becomes suspect of having been trafficked at some point. Upon the seizure of a crime, a seasoned investigator must immediately consider that the firearm(s) in question may have two different TTC’s:
- A Time To Crime based on the recovery of the crime gun or TTC(r), that being the difference in days between the date of purchase of the firearm versus the date of its seizure by Law Enforcement, and
- A Time To Crime based on the discharge of the crime gun or TTC(d) that being the difference in days between the dates of purchase of the firearm versus the first time it was used in a crime as per IBIS records.
In instances where the ballistic information does not reside in IBIS by virtue of a prior test fire of a firearm routinely performed as part of a gun registration process, TTC(d) cannot be determined. TTC(d) will be derived once Law Enforcement recovers the crime gun and the following steps are undertaken:
- It is successfully traced to a purchaser with a corresponding sale date, and
- It is test fired; the evidence derived from such test fire is properly catalogued and correlated through IBIS with the potential hits ultimately confirmed by an expert through microscopic examination & comparison.
Jamaica is a very good example of a Caribbean country that very religiously and conscientiously utilizes IBIS through its Ministry of National Security’s Institute of Forensic Science and Legal Medicine. In the last couple of years, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) seized a number of firearms subsequent to a search warrant at a residence. These crime guns were immediately submitted for tracing through ATF’s eTrace program. Two subjects stateside were identified as original purchasers: Subject A was responsible for one firearm purchased over eight years ago and Subject B was responsible for the rest of the firearms all purchased within a year of the date of seizure. One of those firearms from Subject B had a TTC(r) in excess of eight months, a period that falls in that grey area of uncertainty as to the possibility that the firearm had changed hands in the United States prior to it finding its way to Jamaica. The rest of the TTC(r)’s for Subject B were within the one-year mark and that definitely made him a person of interest stateside. The key piece of evidence that cast a greater shadow of suspicion on Subject B was the fact that after the test firing of the firearm (TTC(r) >8 months) a TTC(d) was derived. IBIS information revealed that the crime gun in question was linked to two separate homicides that had taken place less than two and six months after its purchase in the United States.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”647″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]ATF Agents stateside could then derive a strategy and a line of questioning for the original purchaser centered on this TTC(d). Depending on the information gleaned from the interview, the Agents could then ascertain if the interviewee was truthful or deceitful in his/her answers.
This TTC(r) versus TTC(d) model applies to both Domestic as well as International investigations.
- In the United States, ATF Agents working alongside other Federal, State and local law enforcement can uncover the discrepancies through the National Integrated Ballistic Identification Network (NIBIN) and ascertain if the crime gun was used in other jurisdictions.
- On the international scene, effective communication must be present between ATF and their foreign counterparts so that the information can be shared if a difference exists between TTC(r) and TTC(d)
As investigators trying to solve gun crimes, we must adjust our vocabulary, terminology and critical thinking in order to incorporate and highlight the nuance between TTC(r) and TTC(d). Furthermore it is incumbent upon us to educate not only our peers in law enforcement but also prosecutors about the importance of this variance. Adopting such terminology and approach to investigating gun crimes will enable us to develop better leads that will result in greater professional successes.
We must always remember to explore every possible lead surrounding the recovery of a weapon. It is a common thought that the investigative process surrounding seized firearms should mirror that of a homicide investigation. Neither the homicide victim nor the firearm can recount the events that preceded their discovery but there are many clues left behind on both scenes, clues that an experienced investigator can exploit to his/her advantage.
A great illustration that can really encapsulate the totality of the information that can be derived from a crime gun, is one that I obtained from a friend, a mentor4 and author of a book5, The 13 Critical Tasks: An Inside-Out Approach to Solving More Gun Crime.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”648″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]A good investigator will always trace a crime gun whereas a great investigator will always exploit all of the information that comes from the inside and outside of a crime gun.[/vc_column_text][image_with_animation image_url=”649″ image_size=”full” animation_type=”entrance” animation=”None” animation_movement_type=”transform_y” hover_animation=”none” alignment=”” border_radius=”none” box_shadow=”none” image_loading=”default” max_width=”100%” max_width_mobile=”default”][vc_column_text css=”” text_direction=”default”]4 Triple Barrel Strategies, LLC, registered in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Peter Gagliardi, Principal Officer.
5 Gagliardi, Peter L. 2014. The 13 Critical Tasks: An Inside-Out Approach to Solving More Gun Crime. Second edition. Cote St-Luc, Quebec: Forensic Technology Inc.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row] ]]>